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ABSTRAKSI 
Jaringan ad hoc bergerak (MANETs) adalah jaringan nirkabel multi lompatan dari  
terminal  bergerak  otonom  tanpa  infrastruktur  tetap.  Dalam  MANET,  sulit  untuk 
mendeteksi terminal berbahaya karena topologi jaringan selalu berubah disebabkan 
dari  mobilitas  terminal.  Deteksi  pengacau  adalah  cara  untuk  mengidentifikasi 
perilaku  mengganggu  dan  memberikan  informasi  yang  berguna  untuk  sistem 
pengacau untuk merespon cepat dan untuk menghindari atau mengurangi kerusakan. 
Algoritma  deteksi  anomali  ini  memiliki  keuntungan  karena  mereka  dapat 
mendeteksi  jenis  baru  serangan  (serangan  nol-hari).  Dalam  tulisan  ini,  Sistem 
Deteksi  Pengacau  berbasis  pengelompokan  (ID-Cluster)  yang  sesuai  dengan 
kebutuhan MANET disajikan. Pekerjaan ini membahas kedua isu lapisan routing  
prilaku yang bermasalah, dengan fokus utama pada menggagalkan serangan routing 
dari Routing Sumber Dinamis (DSR). Untuk memvalidasi penelitian, studi kasus 
disajikan  dengan  menggunakan  simulasi  GloMoSim  pada  tingkat  mobilitas  yang 
berbeda. Hasil simulasi menunjukkan bahwa sistem yang diusulkan dapat mencapai 
kinerja yang diinginkan dan memenuhi persyaratan keamanan MANET. 
Kata Kunci: MANET, Sistem Deteksi Pengacau, serangan gangguan routing. 
ABSTRACT 
Mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs) are multi-hop wireless networks of autonomous 
mobile nodes without any fixed infrastructure. In MANETs, it is difficult to detect 
malicious  nodes  because  the  network  topology  constantly  changes  due  to  node 
mobility. Intrusion detection is the means to identify the intrusive behaviors and 
provide  useful  information  to  intruded  systems  to  respond  fast  and  to  avoid  or 
reduce damages. The anomaly detection algorithms have the advantage because they 
can  detect  new  types  of  attacks  (zero-day  attacks).In  this  paper,  the  Intrusion 
Detection System clustering-based (ID-Cluster) that fits the requirement of MANET 
is presented. This work addresses both routing layer misbehaviors issues, with main 
focuses on thwarting routing disruption attack Dynamic Source Routing (DSR). To 
validate the research, a case study is presented using the simulation with GloMoSim 
at  different  mobility  levels.  Simulation  results  show  that  proposed  system  can 
achieve desirable performance and meet the security requirement of MANET. 
Keywords: MANET, Intrusion Detection System, routing disruption attack. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
This document describes, and is written to conform to, author guidelines for the 
journals of AIRCC series. It is prepared in Microsoft Word as a .doc document. 
Although other means of preparation are acceptable, final, camera-ready versions 
must conform to this layout. Microsoft Word terminology is used where appropriate 
in this document. Although formatting instructions may often appear daunting, the 
simplest  approach is  to use this  template and insert headings  and text into  it as 
appropriate. 
2.  OVERVIEW OF DYNAMIC SOURCE ROUTING (DSR) 
The DSR protocol is composed of two mechanisms that work together to allow 
the discovery and maintenance of source routes in the ad hoc network [1], route 
Discovery  Is  the  mechanism  by  which  a  node  S  wishing  to  send  a  packet  to  a 
destination node D obtains a source route to D. Route Discovery is used only when 
S attempts to send a packet to D and does not already know a route to D. and Route 
Maintenance Is the mechanism by which node S is able to detect, while using a 
source route to D, if the network topology has changed such that it can no longer use 
its  route  to  D  because  a  link  along  the  route  no  longer  works.  When  Route 
Maintenance indicates a source route is broken, S can attempt to use any other route 
it happens to know to D, or can invoke Route Discovery again to find a new route. 
Route Maintenance is used only when S is actually sending packets to D. 
3.  ROUTING DISRUPTION ATTACKS AGAINST DSR 
As briefly overviewed in Section 4, nodes process route requests by sending back 
cached route replies or by re-broadcasting route requests in DSR route discovery 
phase whereas dropping some redundant ones, this paper will focus on the detection 
of attacks targeted at MANET routing protocols, more specifically on detecting one 
of the most important active attacks: routing disruption attack. 
4.  CLUSTER-BASED INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEM 
An intrusion detection agent is attached to each node. The agents cooperate with 
each other to form a complete MANET IDS. These IDS agents run independently 
and monitor local activities to detect abnormal behaviors. For the local IDS agent, 
we implement a Markov chain based anomaly detection algorithm. The anomaly-
based method is adopted because it is expected that more types of attacks will be 
launched against MANETs in the future. It is also difficult to obtain the complete 
trace of attacks, which are often required in designing a misuse detection algorithm. 
We logically divide the network into clusters to manage locally generated alerts. By 
integrating the net information from a wider area, this management framework could 
reduce false alarms and improve the detection ratio. In AD-CLUSTER, an algorithm 
utilizing attribute similarities is also presented to aggregate the locally generated 
security related information. 
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  AD-CLUSTER Framework  4.1.
We adopt a cluster-based intrusion detection framework based on the following 
considerations: 
 
Due to the dynamic nature of MANETs, alert flooding is expected in such an 
environment. Attacks are likely to generate multiple related alerts. By creating some 
alert concentration points, we can logically group related alerts together and reduce 
the false alarms generated for various reasons. Note that alert and alarm are different 
concepts as stated before. Flat architecture is undesirable in managing alerts. 
 
When mobility is high, the introduction of the message overhead to create and 
maintain the hierarchy is unbearable. We thus adopt a cluster-based framework. It 
also requires little mobility management efforts. Actually, AD-CLUSTER requires 
no extra control messages propagated within the cluster in order to maintain the 
framework. Whether it is an inter-cluster node or intra-cluster node. A node may 
change its role over time due to mobility. 
  Internal Model of IDS Agent  4.2.
The local IDS agent we use in AD-CLUSTER is shown in Figure 1 The data 
collection module is mainly responsible for collecting the security related data from 
various  audit  sources.  The  detection  engine  will  use  the  data  which  are  parsed, 
filtered and formatted by the data collection module to perform intrusion detection 
locally.  The  Local  Aggregation  and  Correlation  Engine  (LACE)  will  locally 
aggregate and correlate the detection results from different detection engines in the 
IDS agent. No detection model stands alone as a catchall for network penetrations. 
In an environment with high security requirements, it is desirable to have multiple 
detection engines, which enable the use of different detection techniques.  
 
Figure 1. Diagram of an IDS Agent  
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They  will complement  each other to improve the detection performance. The 
functionality of LACE is to combine the detection results of different local detection 
engines. The functionality of Global Aggregation and Correlation Engine (GACE) 
depends on the type of the mobile nodes. If the node is an intra-cluster node, GACE 
is mainly responsible for transmitting the locally generated alerts to the gateway 
nodes in the same cluster; if the node is a gateway node, GACE is to aggregate and 
correlate the detection results from the LACE of its own agent and the LACEs of the 
intra-cluster nodes in the same cluster, and to cooperate with the GACEs of the 
gateway  nodes  with  which  it  has  physical  connections.  The  intrusion  response 
module is to handle the generated alarms. 
5.  LOCAL ANOMALY DETECTION 
We use the following features that are sensitive to routing disruption attacks: 
PCR -Percentage of the change in route entries, and PCH -Percentage of the change 
in number of hops, which reflect the mobility of the network, to construct a Markov 
chain  as  the  normal  profile.  Vector  quantization  (VQ)  approach  is  used  in  this 
process  to  convert  continuous  raw  audit  data  to  categorized  data  items  with 
minimum errors. In order to mitigate the impact of dynamics of MANETs on the 
construction of the normal profile, for those data items whose probability is below 
some threshold, we convert them to a common “rare” symbol. The output of the VQ 
is  then  used  to  construct  a  Markov  chain  model,  which  employs  conditional 
probabilities in its transition probability matrix to represent the temporal profile of 
normal behavior. 
6.  ALERT AGGREGATION 
Due to the lack of detailed analysis of attacks in MANETs, alert aggregation is 
very challenging in MANET environment. Potential complex attack scenarios could 
make the aggregation very complicated. Moreover, there are not many efforts that 
have been devoted to the local detection of MANET attacks. In this section, we 
provide  our  initial  work  in  this  respect.  Because  we  lack  detailed  analysis  of 
MANET attacks in the literature and sophisticated attacks may make the situations 
very complex, we only consider the same occurrence of attacks. Specifically, we still 
target at the routing disruption attack. Because there are not many efforts that have 
been devoted to the local detection of MANET attacks, we use the Markov chain 
based anomaly detection model described in Section 5 as the local detection model. 
  Collaboration Mechanism  6.1.
In mobile ad hoc networks, the attackers can launch attacks when they are close 
to victims. Thus, in general cases, through the local IDS agent attached to the node 
itself and/or neighboring nodes,  these attackers can be detected. There are other 
kinds  of  attacks,  however,  which  the  attackers  may  launch  far  away  from  the 
victims.  What’s  more,  two  or  more  attackers  may  collude  to  launch  more 
complicated attacks. In these situations, it is very difficult for the local IDS agent 
itself to detect the attacks. In addition, the results based on the local IDS agent could 
lead to a very high false positive ratio. There may exist two possible mechanisms for 
the gateway nodes to collaborate. One is the subscription-based mechanism. It is not  
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necessary that the gateway nodes collect all of the security related information from 
the IDSs of intra-cluster nodes in order to draw some conclusions. Based on its own 
status, the IDS of the gateway node can send a subscription message to its intra-
cluster nodes to subscribe security related information. The subscription message 
could contain information that is related to the required data. The intra-cluster nodes 
can thus generate corresponding messages to fit the subscribed requirement. This 
mechanism introduces low communication overhead. However, the gateway node 
needs to carefully analyze the messages in order to determine what information is 
needed.  
The other one is the local broadcast mechanism for IDS agents to collaborate. 
When  the  IDS  of  the  intra-cluster  node  generate  a  local  alert,  it  could  locally 
propagate the detection results to its gateway nodes. When nothing is suspicious in 
the last period, there is no need for the local IDS to propagate security information. 
The neighboring gateway nodes could further collaborate with each other through 
the transmission of the security-related information. In this way, we avoid the use of 
global broadcast. It is also unnecessary to propagate local alerts inside the cluster 
every period. All these strategies can result in less communication overhead. This is 
important  because  message  sending  and  receiving  is  very  expensive  in  terms  of 
energy consumption. This mechanism could also enable gateway nodes to collect 
enough  information  to  make  final  decisions.  For  simplicity,  we  adopt  the  local 
broadcast mechanism in our implementation. In the cluster-based intrusion detection 
framework, only gateway nodes could generate alarms. The local IDS attached to 
local nodes could only generate alerts based on their local information and propagate 
these  alerts  inside  the  cluster.  The  gateway  nodes,  having  gathered  the  alert 
information periodically, could make better final decisions. 
 
  Aggregation Mechanism  6.2.
 
The main objective of the aggregation algorithm and the cluster-based framework 
is to reduce false positive ratios and increase detection ratios by aggregating local 
alerts. Global alerts could be generated to provide more diagnostic information of 
attacks. By grouping alerts together, aggregation will allow a better evaluation of the 
progress of the attack. In order to do so, we need the definition of a data model in 
the form of a class hierarchy to describe the alerts. 
Class Hierarchy of the Alerts: We use the definition and implementation method 
recommended by the Intrusion Detection Working Group (IDWG) to describe the 
alert classes in AD-CLUSTER. The Intrusion Detection Message Exchange Format 
(IDMEF)  [2]  proposed  by  IDWG  aims  at  wired  IDSs.  Its  purpose  is  to  define 
common  data  formats  and  data  exchange  procedures  for  sharing  information  of 
interest to intrusion detection systems. Due to the unique characteristics of MANETs 
and because we focus on the intrusion detection targeted at the network layer, we 
modify the IDMEF data model when designing the alert class. This includes adding 
some new classes (Cluster class, for example) and attributes related to MANETs, 
deleting some unwanted classes (User class, Process class, etc.) and attributes, and 
modifying the definition of some classes and attributes (Location attribute, etc.). The  
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alert class hierarchy for AD-CLUSTER using the UML notation. The alert class 
hierarchy is general in AD-CLUSTER. That is, it can be used as both the input and 
output of the LACE and GACE for better interoperability. When generating an alert, 
the detection engine formats it according to the class hierarchy. We generate all of 
our local alerts compliant with this format. 
Aggregation Algorithm: The performance of the aggregation algorithm depends 
heavily on the performance of the local detection model, the amount of information 
and  the  accuracy  of  the  information  it  provides.  In  MANET  environment,  the 
possible alert burst may crash gateway nodes. Our cases are different. First, due to 
the lack of misuse based MANET IDS; we cannot assume the accurate identification 
of  attackers  provided  by  local  IDSs.  Second,  the  gateway  nodes  execute  the 
aggregation algorithm periodically. At each time period, the aggregation algorithm 
aggregates the received local alerts and makes final decisions. If there is no alert 
received in the last period, no action is taken. This is computationally efficient since 
it avoids executing the algorithm every time an alert is received. Old gateway nodes 
can locally broadcast historical records. This can lead to the quick learning of new 
gateway nodes and thus quick response to intrusion, but requirs more bandwidth 
cost. Also, a new gateway node can obtain information quickly from local IDSs 
from their locally broadcasted alerts.  
Each node has the LACE and GACE module. They use different sources as the 
alert inputs: the input of the LACE is the local detection engines, while the input of 
the GACE is either the local LACE (to intra-cluster nodes) or the intra-cluster nodes 
in the same cluster and the neighboring gateway nodes (to gateway nodes). When a 
local node detects an anomaly, it generates an alert based on the proposed MANET 
IDMEF  data  model.  This  alert  contains  the  identification  of  the  node,  the  alert 
classification,  the  time  information,  and  the  information  of  the  routing  control 
packets in the recent history that could contribute to local alerts. The routing control 
packets in a given time interval are not sufficient for the intrusion detection. In our 
attack  model,  the  local  broadcast  message  also  includes  the  local  history  of  the 
aggregated  routing  control  packets,  i.e.,  how  many  routing  control  packets  are 
received and from which node these control packets are sent out. This could help the 
gateway node make the final decision. Much information could be provided by the 
local alerts.  
We introduce a parameter P-routing abnormal. If the proportion of routing control 
packets  from  a  certain  address  exceeds  P-routing  abnormal,  it  is  abnormal  and 
deserves further investigation. However, in normal cases, it is still possible that a 
node receives a high percentage of routing control packets from some certain node 
in a period, such as in the initial routing discovery period. This is the main reason to 
cause  the  false  positive  alarms  of  our  aggregation  algorithm.  When  there  exist 
attackers in the network, things are different. The attacker would send many falsified 
routing control packets into the network to effectively disrupt the routing logic of 
the network. The local IDSs of the victims, using the Markov chain detection model 
described in the previous section, could generate the alerts and record the source and 
destination  distribution  of  the  routing  control  packets  in  the  last  period.  The 
attacker’s  address  would  dominate  the  source  distribution  of  the  routing  control 
packets.  Having  gathered  this  information  in  the  last  period,  the  gateway  nodes  
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could know the source address distribution of the routing control packets. If the 
probability of a particular source address exceeds some predefined threshold P, this 
address is then identified as the attacker’s address. Note that an attacker cannot use 
different IP addresses to send out fake messages. Otherwise, it can be detected easily 
by its neighbors.  
We now discuss how to decide P. The selection of P depends on attack intensity, 
attack time, node placement, etc. If the threshold P is low, the gateway nodes could 
identify the attack more accurately, thus achieving higher detection ratios. However, 
this could lead to high false positive ratios. If the threshold P is high, the gateway 
nodes could miss the attack, but reduce the false positive ratio. We propose a simple 
approach to decide P in the following way. In normal cases, for a given gateway 
node, if local alerts are received in a given time period, we first pick those source 
addresses  whose  aggregated  probability  is  larger  than  the  parameter  P-routing 
abnormal. We denote these probabilities as Pti (i = 1, 2, . . . , nt) 
      ∑ ∑
       ⁄   
   
  
      (1) 
PGt represents, to gateway node G, the irregularity of the source address distribution 
of the routing control packets when the system is at normal status. Given a test trace, 
we compute its average over all gateway nodes: 
        ∑
   
                                              (2) 
 
Given  the  trace  of  intrusive  activities,  we  first  compute  the  attack  address 
distributions contained in the routing control packets. We denote these probabilities 
as Pai (i = 1, 2,..., na). 
Suppose for a given gateway node G, it has ma time periods in which it receives 
local alerts, we compute the average of Pai , (i = 1, 2,..., na) over these ma periods as: 
      ∑ ∑
        ⁄   
   
  
      (3) 
PGa represents the source address distribution of the routing control packets in the 
gateway node G during the attack time. Given the trace of intrusive activities, we 
compute the average of PGa over all gateway nodes: 
          ∑
   
                                              (4) 
                                                             (5) 
 
7.  SIMULATION STUDY 
  Simulation Model  7.1.
Simulation Platform and Parameter Settings: We use a simulation model based on 
GloMoSim to investigate the performance of the proposed approaches. In the radio  
 
Computer Engineering and Applications Vol. 1, No. 1, June 2012 
 
 
 
 
54        ISSN: 2252-4274 (Print) 
                                                                                              ISSN: 2252-5459 (Online) 
model, capture effects are taken into account. We use the Distributed Coordination 
Function (DCF) of IEEE 802.11 for wireless LANs as the MAC layer protocol. It 
has the functionality to notify the network layer about link failures. We enable the 
promiscuous receive mode of nodes, which enables every received packets delivered 
to the network layer. In the simulation, 30 mobile nodes move in a 1,000 meter X 
500 meter rectangular region. In our simulation, the minimal speed is 3 m/s, and the 
maximal speed is 5 m/s. We change the pause time from 30 seconds to 900 seconds 
to investigate the performance influence at different mobilities. 8 source-destination 
pairs  are  selected  randomly  to  generate  Constant  Bit  Rate  (CBR)  traffic  as  the 
background traffic. The interval time for data transmission is 0.25 second. The size 
of  all  data  packets  is  set  to  512  bytes.  A  packet  is  dropped  when  no 
acknowledgement is received after seven retransmissions or when there is no buffer 
to hold the packet. The buffer size is set to 128 packets. All traffic is generated, and 
the statistical data are collected after a warm-up time of 300 seconds in order to give 
the nodes sufficient time to finish the initialization process. 
  Simulation Results  7.2.
We show that the local IDS constructed using feature PCH demonstrates better 
performance results than that constructed using feature PCR. Therefore, we use the 
local IDS constructed using PCH in this section to illustrate the simulation result. 
 
False  positive  ratio:  We  compute  the  false  positive  ratio  of  the  aggregation 
algorithm based on the same test data used by the local Markov detection model for 
the purpose of comparison. If in the last time period, a gateway node receives no 
local  alerts,  it  will  take  no  action.  As  shown  in  Figure  2(a),  the  aggregation 
algorithm achieves much lower false positive ratios compared to that of the local 
IDS. 
 
Detection  ratio:  We  measure  the  detection  ratio  from  dividing  the  number  of 
gateway nodes that actually generate alarms by the number of gateway nodes that 
should generate alarms. The result is illustrated in Figure 2(b). 
 
 
Figure 2. Performance of AD-Cluster  
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8.  CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
This paper presents the design of a cluster-based intrusion detection system for 
mobile ad hoc networks. Based on a local Markov chain based anomaly detection 
engine,  an  aggregation  algorithm  for  AD-CLUSTER  is  presented  and  a  suitable 
MANET IDS alert data model is described. Using the routing disruption attack as 
the threat model, we have carried out extensive simulation studies and demonstrated 
the effectiveness of our system.  
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